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Abstract 
 
This paper considers the determinants of military spending, building on an emerging literature 
that estimates military expenditure demand functions in cross-section and panel data, 
incorporating ‘arms-race’ type effects.  It updates Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003b) using 
the SIPRI military expenditure database for the period 1988-2003, finding broadly similar 
results. It also shows differences in results across panel methods, particularly the within and 
between estimates and illustrates the importance of recognising and modelling dynamic 
processes within panel data. Heterogeneity is also found to be an important issue and when 
countries are broken up into groups on the basis of per capita income there is no obvious 
systematic pattern in the results. This is seen to imply that the demand for military spending, 
even between two mutually hostile powers, may depend on the whole nature of the 
relationship between them (and other countries and events in the region), and not simply 
Richardsonian action-reaction patterns. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Military spending can impose considerable economic burdens on countries, particularly 
developing ones, making it important to understand what factors are determining it, whether 
strategic or economic. A particular concern is the degree to which particular countries’ are 
influencing neighbours and producing local arms races. A growing literature attempts to 
identify the factors that influence the evolution of military spending and conflict across 
countries. It has moved beyond the earlier cross sectional analyses to use panel data methods, 
which incorporate both time series and cross sectional effects, a recent example of which is 
Collier & Hoeffler (2007).  Initially this was simply a move to pooling data or using static 
panel methods, but the development and understanding of methods to analyse dynamic panels 
has led to their increasing use, as in Dunne & Perlo-Freeman (2003b).  
 
This paper continues this line of investigation. It considers the issues raised in Dunne and 
Smith (2007) on how the military spending of other countries can impact upon a country’s 
military spending, the issues involved in using panel data methods and the importance of 
heterogeneity.. The next section presents the basic arms race, action-reaction theoretical 
model and reviews the econometric issues relating to cross-section and panel data. Section 3 
then develops the work of (Dunne, Perlo-Freeman and Smith, 2008), by  using SIPRI military 
expenditure data for the period 1988-2003 to update the model of the demand for military 
spending in Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003b) and comparing the results using the different 
available econometric techniques. The degree and nature of heterogeneity is then considered 
in Section 4, with Section 5 proving some conclusions.  
 
 
2. Arms Race Models and Strategic Effects 
 
The starting point for any analysis of the impact of one countries arms procurement or 
military spending on anothers is the basic Richardson (1960) ‘arms race’ model. This 
supposes two countries whose military expenditure/level of arms/military capability, m1 and 
m2, are related at time t by the equations: 
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Where ai are exogenous ‘grievance’ terms, bi are ‘reaction’ terms, whereby each country 
responds to the military capability of the other, and ci are ‘fatigue’ terms, usually representing 
some internal limitations on a country’s military spending/capability. Alternatively, a discrete 
formulation can be made using difference equation,  
 
1t 1 1 2t 1 1,t-1
2t 2 2 1t 2 2,t-1
m  = a  + b  m  +c m
m  = a  +b  m  +c m                                                                           
∆
∆
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This basic model has been developed theoretically and empirically in a variety of ways1 The 
search for clear empirical evidence of ‘arms races’ has, however, met with rather limited 
success, with even apparently obvious examples as the Cold War superpower arms race 
proving ambiguous and very much dependent on specification2.  
 
A number of authors, including Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003a and 2003b) and Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004), have sought to generalise the concept of an arms race by looking at the 
demand for military expenditure across a large group of countries, using either cross-section 
or panel data, incorporating a range of economic, political and security variables, and 
including variables for the aggregate military expenditure of neighbours and rivals. In 
addition, Murdoch and Sandler (2002, 2004) have focussed on the ‘spillover effects’ of 
military spending.  
 
To illustrate the issues involved consider a cross-section of countries 1,2,..,i N= , with the 
average value for some military measure im  over some time-period and other determinants 
                                                 
1
 Including the explicit modelling of rational economic decision-making, different dynamic specifications, game 
theory approaches, and empirically with the use of approaches such as co-integration (Dunne and Smith, 2007). 
2
 India and Pakistan provides one of the few examples where researchers have been able to provide consistent 
evidence of a Richardsonian arms race. Even then, Oren (1994) has offered an alternative approach, based on 
hostility levels between the two countries, under which the apparent arms race disappears. Numerous attempts 
have been made to estimate arms races for Turkey and Greece, using a variety of theoretical and econometric 
models, without clear evidence of an arms race emerging. (E.g. Dunne, Nikolaidou and Smith (2003), and Smith, 
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ix . If one particular country i  feels threatened by an alliance of j  and k ; the equations for 
these 3 (out of N) observations take the form: 
 
( ) 'ei j k i im m m xα β γ ε= + + + +  
'
e a
j i k j jm m m xα β β γ ε= + + + +  
'
e a
k i j k km m m xα β β γ ε= + + + +  
 
where eβ  measures the arms race effect from an enemy and aβ  the spillover effect from an 
ally.   Given data on N countries and knowledge of threats and alliances, this model could be 
estimated by say OLS.  
 
There are obvious practical problems; how to determine the strategic effects, the pattern of 
threats and alliances, how to aggregate if adding allies expenditure is not appropriate, what 
time period to average over, and which military measure to use,. An early attempt to deal 
practically with such strategic effects was provided by Rosh (1988), who introduced the 
concept of a security web. Instead of dyadic relationships, neighbours and other countries 
(such as regional powers) that can affect a nation’s security were considered part of a 
country’s Security Web and their military spending was aggregated3. More recently, Dunne 
and Perlo-Freeman (2003a) developed this approach as discussed below.   
 
There are also econometric issues4.  Collier and Hoeffler (2004) estimate arms race 
multipliers by considering the two country case: 
 
i i jm a bm= +  
 
An exogenous unit increase in ia  would cause an increase in the other countries military 
expenditure by jbm  feeding back on im  and giving a total effect of 1/(1 )b−  on spending by 
                                                 
3
 Rosh calculates the degree of militarisation of a nation’s Security Web by averaging the military burdens of 
those countries in the web, finding it to have a significant positive effect on a country’s military burden. 
4
 There is an issue of simultaneity, but it is not the standard one, where the right hand side variable may be 
determined by another equation. All N military expenditures are determined by the same equation. It is more like 
a lagged dependent variable issue and the conditions for consistent estimation by OLS are the same as that case: 
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country i . They distinguish own expenditure and neighbour expenditure arms race 
multipliers. 
 
Using cross-section data, rather than time-series for individual countries increases the sample 
size considerably and allows one to measure the effect of variables which tend not to vary 
very much within countries. The cost of this benefit is the assumption that the arms race and 
alliance parameters are the same across all countries. This assumption can be weakened and 
allowing the coefficients to differ across countries and collect the independent variables in a 
vector iz  gives the model 
 
'
i i i i im zα β ε= + +  
 
with i iα α ν= + , i iβ β η= + . When ( )iEα α= , ( )iEβ β= and iη  and iν are random, 
independent of the regressors, OLS will provide consistent estimates of β . These 
assumptions are, however, quite strong and with the availability of panel data models of the 
form  
 
'
it i i it itm zα β ε= + +    
 
can be estimated and the homogeneity or independence assumptions tested (Dunne and Smith, 
2007). With panel data one can employ a larger sample and allow for heterogeneity in the 
responses of different countries.  
 
Concentrating on a single equation5, we have data on a scalar dependent variable itm , military 
expenditure, for a sample of countries 1,2,...,i N=  and years 1,2,...,t T=  and data on a 
vector of k  exogenous variables itx , which does not include unity for an intercept, but which 
includes other countries military expenditure. Suppose that we are interested in measuring the 
linear effect of itx  on itm . This is a static model, in that itx  does not include lagged dependent 
variables; we discuss dynamics below.  
                                                                                                                                                        
im  can be treated as predetermined in the equation for jm  if ( ) 0i iE ε ε = .  If there are correlated shocks to 
different countries or spatial serial correlation, this assumption will not hold (Dunne and Smith, 2007). 
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A central issue in the choice of estimator is the relative size of N and T. The traditional panel 
literature deals with cases where N is large and T small, maybe only two or three time 
periods. Asymptotic analysis is done letting N → ∞ . The time-series literature deals with the 
case where T is large and N small and asymptotics let T → ∞ . Recently there has been 
interest in panel time-series where N and T are of the same orders of magnitude and 
asymptotics let both N → ∞  and T → ∞ in some way. What estimators are appropriate in the 
three cases differs. Define the country and overall means as  
 
1 1
1 1 1
;  ( ) .
T N T
i it it
t i t
m T m m NT m− −
= = =
= =∑ ∑∑  
 
The total variation in the dependent variable is the sum of the within country variation and the 
between country variation  
 
2 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ,i iit it
i t i t i
m m m m T m m− = − + −∑∑ ∑∑ ∑  
 
similarly for the regressors (Dunne and Smith, 2007).  
 
The main panel estimators differ in how they treat the within and between variation. The 
estimators include: 
 
• Pooled OLS which gives the within and between variation equal weight, and uses least 
squares on: 
 
;it it itm x uα β ′= + +  
 
      where β   is a 1k ×   vector of slope coefficients; 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
5
 To focus on this, we will ignore feedback issues, to concentrate on a single equation. When one allows for 
panel VARS and VECMs, the situation becomes more complicated. 
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• The within estimator (also known as the one way fixed effects, least squares dummy 
variables and a variety of other names) which allows intercepts to differ across countries 
but constrains the slopes to be the same  
 
it i it itm x uα β ′= + +  
   
this only uses the within variation and is equivalent to OLS on  
 
itiitiit uxxyy +−=− )(')( β  
 since ii iy xα β ′= − ;  
 
• The between or cross-section estimator, which only uses the cross-section variation in the 
country means:  
 
;i i im x uα β ′= + +  
 
• The two way fixed effects estimator which constrains slopes to be the same, but allows 
intercepts to vary freely both over country and year:  
 
it i t it itm x uα α β ′= + + +  
 
this allows for a completely flexible trend, or unobserved common factor, which impacts 
on each country by the same amount; 
 
• The random coefficient model (RCM), ,   which allows all the parameters to differ over 
countries:  
 
it i i it itm x uα β ′= + +  
 
and calculates weighted averages of the individual time-series estimates ˆiβ  the weights, iW   
being based on the variances of the ˆiβ  (Swamy, 1970). 
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The random effects estimator assumes that slopes are identical and intercepts are randomly 
distributed independently of the regressors. It calculates the optimal combination of within 
and between variation under these assumptions6.  
 
Strictly speaking, we should distinguish the parameters: the β  in the within equation is a 
different parameter from the β  in the between equation. The distinction is important because 
the cross-section may be measuring something quite different from the time-series7.  In static 
models, if the coefficients, iα  and iβ  are randomly distributed, independently of the itx , all 
these estimators will produce unbiased estimators of the expected values of the coefficients 
( )iE α  and ( )iE β .  However, the independence assumption may not hold and the cross-
section (between country) effects can be very different from the time-series (within country) 
effects.  The between estimate Bβ  and the within estimate Wβ  will differ if the iα  are 
correlated with the ix  and the two estimates may even be of opposite sign 
 
A further issue arises with dynamic models since the within (fixed effect) estimator of  
 
1it i it it itm x m uα β λ −′= + + +  
 
 is consistent for large T,  but is not consistent for fixed T, large N. In this case the coefficient 
of the lagged dependent variable is biased downwards. This is the standard small T bias of the 
OLS estimator in models with lagged dependent variables. There are a variety of instrumental 
variable estimators for this case. However, if the true model is heterogeneous  
 
1it i it i it itm x m uα β λ′ −= + + +  
 
                                                 
6
 The TSCS (time-series cross-section) estimator allows for between group heteroskedasticity and within group 
serial correlation. This estimator is rarely used in economics, because it treats the symptoms of misspecification 
(heteroskedasticity and serial correlation) rather than their likely causes (parameter heterogeneity and dynamic 
misspecification), though it is popular elsewhere (Dunne and Smith, 2007). 
7
 Dunne and Smith (2007) also discuss a number of other estimators. The Zellner SURE estimator allows for 
non-zero between group covariances and possibly heterogeneous slopes. This is only feasible when T>N, and 
only appropriate when the factors causing between group dependence are not correlated with the regressors. 
There are other estimators which can deal with between group dependence when N>T, see the review in Smith 
and Fuertes (2005). 
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and homogeneity of the slopes is incorrectly imposed, the within estimator is not consistent 
even for large T. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is biased upwards towards 
unity (assuming the regressors are positively serially correlated as is usually the case). The 
RCM estimator is however consistent for large T, though it suffers the small T lagged 
dependent variable bias. Comparison of the various estimators, which are subject to different 
biases, can allow us to infer which biases are most important. 
 
In the individual regressions, 
  
,it i i it itm x uα β ′= + +  
 
if the variables are integrated of order one, I(1) and are cointegrated (the error term itu   is 
I(0)) then the least squares estimate of ˆiβ   gives a super-consistent estimate of the long-run 
effect for large T.  However, as noted above if the variables are I(1)  but are not cointegrated 
(the error term is also I(1)), then ˆiβ  does not converge to iβ , as T → ∞ , but to a random 
variable. The regression is spurious. However, pooling or averaging over groups, can allow 
one to obtain a consistent estimate of an average long run effect from the levels regression. 
Thus the pooled or average estimates from static levels regressions may be of interest even if 
individual countries equations differ and do not cointegrate (Dunne and Smith, 2007). 
 
Clearly the use of panel data methods can provide benefits to the researcher, but care is required 
to understand the nature of the models and how relevant they are for the particular study.  
 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
To investigate these issues empirically we start from the model used in Dunne and Perlo-
Freeman (2003a,b), and update the analysis, which means moving from using ACDA data on 
military expenditure to the SIPRI data, which is the largest consistent database available, c 
Covering 136 developing and developed countries from 1988-200389. The results for the fixed 
                                                 
8
 The SIPRI database goes up to 2005, but data for the Democracy variable used in the regressions is only 
available up to 2003. 
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effects regressions are presented in Table 1, with the dependent variable the log of military 
burden and the independent variables (with variable names in brackets): 
• log of GDP (lgdp),  
• log of population (lpop)  
• War index variable10 (war)  
• Democracy variable using the Polity 4 dataset (polity)  
• log of aggregate ‘Security Web’ military spending11 (lsw)  
• log of aggregate Rivals’ military spending (a subset of the Security Web consisting of 
those powers considered hostile to the country in question)12 (lriv) 
• ‘Great Power Enemy’ dummy for countries that are considered to be an enemy of a 
‘great power’ (US or USSR) (gpe) 
In addition, a number of dummy variables are used:  
• Cold War dummy covers the years 1988-90, to account for the possibility that the end 
of the Cold War led to a general reduction in threat perceptions. (cold) 
• Cold Warrior dummy is set to 1 for the years 1988-90 for NATO and Warsaw Pact 
members only. (coldw) 
• Iraq Crisis dummy is set to 1 for the years 1990-91 and 2002-03, to capture the effect of 
the two Iraq wars as ‘regional bads’ that may have increased threat perceptions, even 
for those countries not directly involved.13 (iraq) 
 
As a ‘security web’ is likely to have a different meaning for countries involved in the NATO 
and former Warsaw Pact alliance systems than for those who were not, two versions of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
9
 Many studies (including those by Dunne and Perlo-Freeman) involve chaining together military spending data 
from different editions of the SIPRI and ACDA yearbooks, which is subject to inaccuracies due to periodic re-
estimation of the data by the two organisations. The SIPRI military expenditure project has now however 
ensured that it has consistent data series for all countries in its database going back to 1988. 
10
 An index running from 0 to 4, based on the Uppsala Department of Peace and Conflict Research database. The 
previous study had separate variables for External War and Civil War, but the effects of these were fairly similar, 
so the two types of war were combined in this study. 
11
 A country’s Security Web (based on the idea of Rosh (1988) is the set of counties that are considered to affect 
a given country’s security. These are mostly neighbours, but may also include regional powers and sometimes 
more distant rivals (e.g. Cuba-South Africa during the Angola war). The military spending of superpowers is 
usually excluded from a country’s Security Web, where it is considered that it would be impossible to defend 
against the superpower with conventional military expenditure. 
12
 The classification of countries as mutually hostile is based on an analysis of a number of datasets, including 
the HIIK Database of Violent and Non-violent Conflicts, and the Dyamid datset of dyadic armed conflict events. 
The previous study also used a further subset, Enemies, but this latter variable was insignificant, suggesting that 
the effect of those classified as ‘Enemies’ and those merely considered ‘Potential Enemies’ was not significantly 
different. Thus only the broader class of Potential Enemies (or Rivals) is used here. 
13
 These countries are: Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, UAE, 
Yemen. (Iraq is not in the sample, as there is no data for Iraq in the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database). 
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model were  estimated. One, using the full sample and excluding the Security Web variable, 
and the other including this variable but excluding most NATO and WP countries and of 
course the Cold Warrior dummy14.  The results, presented in Table 1, are similar to Dunne 
and Perlo-Freeman (2003b), with the income elasticity of demand slightly less than unity, 
population negative and highly significant15, war positive and highly significant, and 
democracy negative. However, the Rivals’ military spending variable16, while positive, is 
insignificant and small in absolute value, while the Security Web variable in Model 2 is both 
positive and highly significant17. Surprisingly, there is a strongly negative coefficient on the 
Great Power Enemy dummy, which may simply be an anomaly and the other results did not 
change significantly when this variable was removed18.  
 
                                                 
14
 Greece and Turkey are included, as it was considered that their Security Webs could be defined in terms of the 
Mid-East/Balkans systems. The former Soviet republics of the South Caucasus and Central Asia are also 
included. 
15
 One interpretation of this result within a rational maximising model is that higher population creates additional 
civil needs faster than it creates additional security needs. 
16
 Corresponding to the Potential Enemies variable in the previous study 
17
 This may suggest that there are stronger ‘emulation’ effects than in the past, with countries seeking to keep up 
with their neighbours’ purchases of the latest equipment aside from any threat, but another explanation is that, in 
the mostly post-Cold War environment where interstate war is less prevalent and less of a threat for most 
countries, threat perceptions may be based more on common regional threats, including terrorism, spillovers 
from conflicts in the region, etc. Examples of such common threats are seen in the Iraq crisis, Cold War and 
Cold Warrior dummies, which are all positive and significant, with quite large coefficients on the Iraq Crisis and 
Cold Warrior variables in particular. 
18
 There are in fact very few countries in the sample whose GPE status has changed over the period Specifically, 
Angola, Cambodia, Turkey (all ceasing to be GPEs after 1990) and Serbia (after 2000). The characterisation of 
the first two is in any case quite marginal, and in the case of Turkey the ending of hostility with the Soviet Union 
is already captured by the end of the Cold War and it is only these cases that can be picked up by the fixed 
effects estimator. Thus the coefficient may simply be picking up idiosyncratic conditions in these countries.  
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Table 1: Fixed Effects Regression results 1988-2003 
 
Dependent variable: 
log military burden. 
Model 1 (all countries) Model 2 (exc. NATO, WP 
other than Greece, Turkey) 
Variable Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio 
Log GDP (lgdp) -0.052 -2.3** -0.054 -2.1** 
Log Population (lpop) -0.45 -5.1*** -0.52 -5.1*** 
War  0.13 10.1*** 0.14 9.7*** 
Democracy (polity) -0.0078 -3.3*** -0.0050 -1.8* 
Log Security Web 
military spending (lsw) 
  0.12 4.2*** 
Log Rivals’ military 
spending (lriv) 
0.0076 1.6 0.0062 1.2 
Iraq crisis dummy (Iraq) 0.15 3.2*** 0.13 2.6*** 
Cold War dummy (cold) 0.072 3.0*** 0.059 2.2** 
Cold Warrior dummy 
(coldw) 
0.19 4.2***   
Great Power Enemy 
(gpe) 
-0.69 -5.7*** -0.55 -4.3*** 
   
R2 (within) 0.17 0.17 
No. observations 1856 1364 
No. countries 136 103 
Note: *** sig at 1%; ** sig at 5% 
 
 
These results are from a fixed effects static model and there are three specific issues have to 
consider as discussed in section 2, the choice of panel estimation method, the treatment of 
dynamics and the degree of heterogeneity within the panel. The results in Table 2 illustrate 
the variation across the methods, with clear differences between the fixed effects, random 
effects and the OLS estimates. It is also clear that the simple pooled OLS provides somewhat 
misleading results. As expected there are also marked differences, between within and 
between estimators. As discussed these are likely to be measuring different things, but it is 
 13 
interesting that the cross section finds no role for economic variables and that this consistent 
with other studies. There are also differences between static and dynamic results, with the 
lagged dependent variable significant. There is, however, an issue of using the fixed effects 
model with a lagged dependent variable with a limited number of years of data. The results 
do, however, serve to illustrate the likely importance of the dynamics. 
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Table 2: Summary results for Model with LSW 
 
 
Results for models with lsw  
Dependent variable : logburden  
 
  
Variables 
 
Static 
 
Between 
 
 
Dynamic 
 
Long run 
 OLS FE RE   OLS FE OLS FE 
Lgdp 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01  0.00 0.04 0.01 0.11 
Lpop -0.11 -0.52 -0.07 -0.06  -0.01 -0.17 -0.09 -0.41 
War 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.17  0.03 0.08 0.38 0.20 
Polity -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03  0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 
Lriv 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03  0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Iraq 0.75 0.13 0.14 3.67  0.15 0.13 1.76 0.33 
Cold 0.05 0.06 0.11 -0.26  0.03 0.07 0.38 0.17 
Gpe -0.14 -0.55 -0.36 -0.21  0.01 -0.13 0.06 -0.32 
Lsw 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.09  0.01 0.02 0.13 0.05 
logburden1      0.91 0.60     
_cons 1.32 9.60 1.73 1.25  0.07 1.87 0.79 4.63 
Rsq 0.28 0.17 0.15 0.03  0.92    
No. countries 103.00  
 
  101.00    
No. obs 1364.00     1251.00    
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As has been noted, the Fixed Effects estimator does not allow for parameter heterogeneity in 
the slope coefficients, only in the intercepts. A random coefficients (mean group) estimator 
would deal with this problem, but we do not have a sufficient number of time periods for this 
to be feasible, and too many of the variables are time-invariant for too many countries. Where 
the variables are I(1) (as variables such as GDP, military spending and population typically 
are, at least over short periods) the FE estimator may nonetheless give consistent estimates of 
the average coefficients. (Dunne and Smith, 2007). The question remains of exactly how 
important heterogeneity and this is considered in the next section. 
 
 
4. Heterogeneity  
 
To give some idea of the importance of heterogeneity we divided the sample into four groups 
based on average GDP/capita over the sample, running the regressions above on each. For the 
bottom two groups we used model 2, as the security web is defined for most of these 
countries. For the richest group, we used model 1, as a high proportion of these countries are 
members of the alliance systems for which security web is not defined, and for the second 
highest group we used both. The results in Table 3 do indeed show that there is considerable 
heterogeneity in the determinants of milex. The poorest group showing the clearest effect of 
security web and rivals’ milex, with positive and highly significant coefficients on both, and 
the coefficient on security web being as large as 0.37. There was a strong positive effect of 
war, and a negative effect of democracy as in the main sample, and a clear negative effect of 
GDP (on military burden). In contrast to the overall regression, population was clearly 
insignificant, though still with a negative sign. The within R2 was quite high at 0.27. 
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Table 3 – Fixed Effects regression results for different income groups. 
 
Variable Low income Mid-low Mid-high 
(model 1) 
Mid-high 
(model 2) 
High income 
Log GDP -0.43*** 
(0.140) 
-0.400*** 
(0.0913) 
0.0522** 
(0.0259) 
0.0287 
(0.0266) 
-0.981*** 
(0.0684) 
Log pop. -0.115 
(0.248) 
-0.0562 
(0.203) 
-0.858*** 
(0.239) 
-0.824*** 
(0.259) 
0.338** 
(0.159) 
War 0.111*** 
(0.027) 
0.0299 
(0.0248) 
0.156*** 
(0.0256) 
0.157*** 
(0.0256) 
0.0332 
(0.0252) 
Democracy -0.0102** 
(0.00468) 
0.00090 
(0.00392) 
-0.0273*** 
(0.00616) 
-0.0229*** 
(0.00699) 
0.00966 
(0.0217) 
Log Security 
Web 
0.369*** 
(0.637) 
-0.0226 
(0.0395) 
---------- 0.163*** 
(0.0588) 
------------ 
Log Rivals 0.0463*** 
(0.0126) 
-0.00225 
(0.00784) 
-0.0206* 
(0.0107) 
-0.0251** 
(0.0111) 
-0.00004 
(0.0064) 
Cold war 
dummy 
-0.0168 
(0.0583) 
0.0300 
(0.0442) 
0.0363 
(0.0539) 
0.0200 
(0.0570) 
-0.0453 
(0.0294) 
Cold Warrior 
dummy 
----- ------- -0.0735 
(0.111) 
-------- 0.144*** 
(0.0384) 
Iraq dummy -0.243 
(0.279) 
0.0221 
(0.100) 
0.152* 
(0.0891) 
0.123 
(0.0894) 
0.185*** 
(0.0420) 
R2 (within) 0.266 0.131 0.207 0.240 0.521 
No. countries 34 31 33 24 33 
No. obs. 420 395 447 329 517 
Standard errors in brackets. * = sig. at 10% level ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
 
The second poorest group showed the least clear results, with only GDP significant and 
negative, all other variables being jointly insignificant. The coefficients on these variables 
were also of much smaller magnitude than for other groups, so that this is not just a matter of 
high standard errors due perhaps to lack of variation. This might suggest that there are further 
major heterogeneities within this group that are largely cancelling each other out to give no 
clear overall pattern. The R2 was 0.13 
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The second richest group showed a mixed pattern; in model 2 there was a large (-0.88), 
negative and significant coefficient on population, again positive and significant coefficients 
on war and security web and negative and significant on democracy, but a negative coefficient 
on rivals’ milex.19 There are a few countries for which the Iraq dummy is meaningful (Iran, 
Turkey, Syria), and the coefficient is positive but insignificant. Model 1 included a larger 
number of countries (many of the former Warsaw Pact), and had similar results, except that 
GDP was now significant and slightly positive, and the Iraq dummy was also marginally 
significant. The R2 was 0.20 for model 1, and 0.24 for model 2. 
 
The richest group, which included mostly the developed world countries, Israel and the Gulf 
states and some of the richer Asian countries, showed a decidedly different pattern: the 
coefficient on GDP was highly significant and negative, in fact not significantly different 
from -1, implying that for these countries military spending is independent of income. 
Population was significant and positive, in contrast to the overall results. The only other 
significant variables were the ‘Cold Warrior’ and Iraq dummies. The R2 was higher than the 
rest at 0.52. For these countries, then, military spending seemed primarily to relate to major 
security issues such as the Cold War and the Iraq crises. This in turn immediately implies 
heterogeneities, in that these dummies were not relevant for all countries in the group. This 
‘average’ sub-panel result tells us very little about the determinants of military spending in 
(for example) Brunei, Cyprus, Finland, Singapore, South Korea or Sweden. Curiously, the 
Cold War dummy is not significant in any subgroup although it is significant in the overall 
results. 
 
There no obvious a pattern to the differences between these groups, and indeed these results 
do not suggest that differences in income are the basis of heterogeneities. A regional sub-
classification sheds no more light, other than obvious points such that it was in the Middle 
East that the Iraq crises were most relevant, and in Nato and the Warsaw Pact the Cold War. 
In other words, it would seem that heterogeneities must be looked for at the individual 
country level. This is not to say that the overall panel results are meaningless – they do 
suggest general tendencies that must apply in a majority of countries for which the issue is 
                                                 
19
 As rivals are also included in the security web, this does not imply an overall negative result, as the positive 
coefficient on security web was much higher. However it does suggest that these countries respond less to the 
milex of rivals than to that of other neighbours. 
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pertinent; for example the general negative influence of democracy on military spending, one 
of the most consistent results in analysis of milex demand, but one which cannot be detected 
in this study for countries that have not changed their democratic status over the period; or 
perhaps the tendency of nearby countries to respond to common threat perceptions which may 
be suggested both by the Iraq dummy and the Security Web variable; but that which issues are 
pertinent at a given time, and in what way, will vary considerably from country to country. 
 
 
To explore more specifically the arms race concept (proxied by the Rivals’ milex effect) it is 
useful to get an idea of the different nature of the reactions by different countries to change in 
their rivals’ military spending. Dunne & Perlo-Freeman (2003b) found this effect to be highly 
significant and robust in the whole sample, while this study has found a positive but 
insignificant result, but it may be that this masks very different patterns of response in 
different countries. 
 
To investigate this, country-specific variables have been constructed, equal to the Rivals 
variable times the dummy for each country in question, for those countries who at some stage 
had non-zero values of this variable.20 The other independent variables are kept as single 
variables for the whole sample. Thus, each country is allowed to have a different response to 
the aggregate military spending of its rivals, although homogeneity is still assumed for the 
other variables. A like response is also assumed for each country to its various different rivals, 
where it has more than one. 
 
Again other variables give similar results to those in table 1, although population becomes 
insignificant, and some other variables become less significant. Out of 35 country-specific 
Rivals’ military spending variables, 8 are positive and significant, 5 are negative and 
significant, 12 are positive and insignificant, 10 are negative and insignificant. (See results in 
Table 3 and figure 1). Coefficient values range from -3 to +2, although clearly these must be 
treated with extreme caution given the small T. Thus, in keeping with the lack of significance 
of the Rivals’ military spending variable overall, there appears to be no consistent pattern to 
the influence of the variable on individual countries. On the other hand, a fair number of 
countries do appear to have positive and significant responses to rivals’ milex, and in most of 
                                                 
20
 The log variables were constructed as log(aggregate military spending + 1), so that 0 values are indeed 
transformed to 0. 
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these cases the rival(s) in question mostly have at least a positive (albeit insignificant) 
coefficient. 
 
It should be noted that this was the model with the Security Web military spending variable; 
so there seems to be a general influence of neighbours’ military spending, but no consistency 
with regard to there being an incremental influence from those countries who are considered 
rivals. Again, this may suggest emulation effects or common threat perceptions, but not 
necessarily arms races in the conventional sense. A similar exercise was conducted for the 
ACDA dataset used in Dunne & Perlo-Freeman (2003b) and this also showed a highly 
heterogenous pattern, but a much greater preponderance of positive coefficients on the 
country-specific Potential Enemies variables, in keeping with the significant positive 
coefficient on the general Potential Enemies variable (Dunne, Perlo-Freeman and Smith, 
2008). 
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Table 3: Results for Country-specific Variables  
 
Country 
 
Potential Enemies  
Military Spending 
Algeria -ve ins. 
Angola -ve sig. 
Argentina -ve ins. 
Armenia -ve ins. 
Bangladesh -ve ins. 
Bolivia +ve ins. 
Cameroon +ve ins. 
Chile -ve ins. 
China -ve ins. 
Cyprus -ve sig. 
Egypt +ve ins. 
Eritrea +ve ins. 
Ethiopia +ve sig. 
Greece +ve ins. 
India +ve ins. 
Iran -ve sig. 
Israel -ve ins. 
Jordan -ve ins. 
South Korea +ve ins. 
Mauritania +ve sig. 
Morrocco +ve ins. 
Mozambique +ve sig. 
Myanmar +ve ins. 
Nigeria +ve sig. 
Pakistan -ve sig. 
Peru -ve ins. 
Rwanda +ve ins. 
Saudi +ve ins. 
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Senegal +ve ins. 
South Africa +ve sig. 
Sudan +ve sig. 
Syria -ve ins. 
Turkey +ve sig. 
Uganda +ve sig. 
Vietnam -ve sig. 
  
Figure 1 
Histogram of coefficients of log rivals
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5. Conclusions 
 
This paper has contributed the growing literature on the determinants of military spending, 
that uses cross-section and panel data to estimate models that incorporate ‘arms-race’ type 
effects. It has considered the theoretical and econometric questions that arise from 
Richardsonian action-reaction arms races between countries in terms of military expenditure, 
and that demonstrate military expenditure spillover effects across countries, in cross-section 
and panel data models. A key question is whether it is meaningful to talk of an ‘arms race’ in 
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panel data or cross-section data, and it has been suggested that such a concept is 
problematical. Rather, it may be more appropriate to talk about the relevant variables – 
aggregate military spending of the ‘Security Web’ (i.e. all neighbours and other security-
influencing powers) and the aggregate military spending of ‘Potential Enemies’ or ‘Rivals’. A 
number of econometric issues that arise in estimating and interpreting these models were also 
considered and illustrated by updating the model of the demand for military spending in 
Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003b) on SIPRI military expenditure data for the period 1988-
2003. Broadly similar results were found, although the effect of neighbours’ military spending 
is seen to come more equally from all the countries in a given country’s Security Web, rather 
than particularly coming from rivals’ military spending.  
 
Comparing the results across different panel data estimation methods showed considerable 
variation. It was clear that the simple pooled OLS provides somewhat misleading results, 
while there were also differences between the fixed effects and random effects. The within 
and between estimators are likely to be measuring different things and so the differences in 
results were expected, but what was interesting that the cross section finds no role for 
economic variables and this is consistent with other cross section studies. Introducing lagged 
dependent variable to the fixed effects models showed the importance of recognising the 
dynamics of the processes.   
While the Fixed Effects estimator does not allow for parameter heterogeneity in the slope 
coefficients, only in the intercepts, a random coefficients (mean group) estimator is precluded 
by the limited number of years of data. Although the FE estimator may nonetheless give 
consistent estimates of the average coefficients with I(1) variables (Dunne and Smith, 2007), 
the nature and importance of heterogeneity in the panel was investigated, by dividing the 
sample into 5 groups based on income. The  results showed no obvious pattern to the 
differences and did not suggest that differences in income are the basis of the heterogeneity. A 
regional sub-classification sheds no more light, other than obvious points such that it was in 
the Middle East that the Iraq crises were most relevant, and in NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
during the Cold War.  This means that while the panel results can suggest general tendencies 
that must apply in a majority of countries, the issues that are pertinent at a given time, and the 
way they impact, will vary considerably from country to country. When country-specific 
Rivals/Potential Enemies military spending variables are constructed, the expected presence 
of considerable heterogeneity was confirmed.  
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These findings suggest that the highly heterogenous pattern of determinants of military 
spending, means even considering two mutually hostile powers, their military burdens will 
depend on the whole nature of the relationship between them and other countries and events 
in the region, and not just a dyadic Richardsonian Action-reaction process. Thus the policy 
implications are that focussing too much on dyadic country interactions in attempting to limit 
arms races may fail to deal with the security problem and that wider regional security 
agreements may be necessary. 
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